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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SOME PROBLEMS IN THE CLASSIFICATION
OF LEGACIES
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870:
ART. 1606. A universal legacy is a testamentary disposition,
by which the testator gives to one or several persons the
whole of the property which he leaves at his decease.
ART. 1612. The legacy under a universal title is that by
which a testator bequeathes a certain portion of the effects
of which the law permits him to dispose, as a half, a third,
or all of his movables, or a fixed proportion of all of his im-
movables or all of his movables.
ART. 1625. Every legacy, not included in the definition be-
fore given of universal legacies and legacies under a universal
title, is a legacy under a particular title.
INTRODUCTION
Our Code divides testamentary bequests into three categories:
universal legacies, legacies under universal title, and particular
legacies. Whether or not a legatee will contribute to the debts
of the succession, have seizin of the estate, profit by the lapse of
other legacies and many other such questions can be answered
only after the legacy has been classified.
Historically, these articles are the result of a compromise be-
tween the customary law of France and the written law. Under
the customs there were three classes of succession beneficiaries:
heirs (of blood), universal legatees, and particular legatees.'
Heirs alone had seizin, regardless of their share in the estate. On
the other hand, in the written law no testament was valid with-
out an instituted heir 2 (really a legatee) who was seized in full
of the succession.' The redacteurs of the Code Napoleon adopted
the classification of the customs with few additions. The problem
of seizin was solved by creating the category of legacy under
universal title.' These forms were written into our Code of 1825,
and later into the Code of 1870.
1. Legacies under universal title did not exist, being classified simply as
universal legacies. 4 Pothier, Oeuvres, Trait6 des Testamens (Nouvelle ed.
1830) 528-530, c. II, §§ 1, 2.
2. Id. at 528, § 1(1).
3. Troplong, Droit Civil Expliqu6, 3 Des Donations Entre-Vifs et Des
Testaments (3 ed. 1872) 310-311, no 1763.
4. Coin-Deslisle, Commentaire Du Titre des Donations et Testamens
(Nouvelle ed. 1855) 448-449, no 16; 21 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoleon,




The Universal Legacy and the Legacy Under Universal Title
The wording of Article 10035 of the Code Napoleon caused
great concern to the early commentators. It stated that a univer-
sal legacy was a disposition of the entire estate of the testator.
Subsequent provisions of the Code, however, spoke of universal
legacies in wills containing other legacies.6 Fortunately, the com-
mentators unanimously agreed that Article 1003 comprehended
only the residiuum or eventual entirety of the estate,? a view up-
held by the French courts.8 Baudry-Lacantinerie explainsg that
the word universalitd used in this article, designates the legal
concept of patrimong. This includes not only the goods left by
the testator, but also the debts and charges imposed by law or by
the will of the deceased. Had the legislature intended to require
a legacy of all the goods of the testator, it would have used the
word totalit6.
Article 1010,10 after stating the general principle that the
5. Art. 1003, French Civil Code: "Le legs universeZ est la disposition testa-
mentaire par laquelle le testateur donne 4 une ou plusieurs personnes l'unt-
versalitd des bien qu'il laissera d son ddcds."
(Translation) "A universal legacy is a testamentary disposition by which
the testator gives to one or several persons all of the property which he may
leave at his decease."
6. Arts. 1004 and 1011, French Civil Code, all contemplate situations in
which a universal legacy would exist together with a legacy by universal
title or with heirs to the reserve.
7. 11 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1913) 445, § 714;
11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil,
2 Des Donations (3 ed. 1905) 194, no 2289; 3 Colin et Capitant, Cours EI-
mentaire de Droit Civil Francais (8 ed. 1936) 946, no 1170; 21 Demolombe, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 473, no 540; 13 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais
(2 ed. 1876) 561, no 509; 4 Marcad6, Explication Th6orique et Pratique du
Code Civil (7 ed. 1873) 69, bWs94; 5 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit
Civil Frangais (1933) 641, no 611; 3 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais (Dernibre
ed. 1833) 183, no 506; Troplong, op. cit. supra note 3, at 321, no 1774.
8. Req. 7 avril 1874, Dalloz 1875.1.166; Civ. 5 juillet 1886, Dalloz 1886.1.465;
Nancy, 9 d~cembre 1891, Dalloz 1892.2.270; Req. 22 janvier 1894, Dalloz 1894.
1.232; Req. 27 juillet 1899, Dalloz 1899.1.355, Sirey 1900.1.264; Req. 7 janvier
1902, Dalloz 1903.1.302; Portiers 29 janvier 1919, Dalloz 1919.2.41; Civ. 15 juillet
1930, Sirey 1930.1.387.
9. 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 7, at 194, no 2290. A similar
view is taken by Troplong, loc. cit. supra note 7.
10. Art. 1010, French Civil Code: "Le legs a titre universel est celui par
lequel le testateur lgue une quote-part des biens dont la lot lut permet de
disposer, telle qu'une moitid, un tiers, ou tous les immeubles, ou tout son
mobilier, ou une quotitd fixe de tous ses immeubles ou de tout son mobilier.
"Tout autre legs no forme qu'une disposition d titre particulier."
(Translation) "A legacy under universal title is that by which the testa-
tor bequeaths a certain portion of the goods of which the law permits him to
dispose, as a half, a third, or all the Immovables, or all the movables, or a
fixed portion of all his immovables or of all his movables.
"All other legacies form only a disposition by particular title."
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disposition of a quote-part of the estate is a legacy by universal
title, gives several examples. A majority of the commentators
have agreed that these examples are restrictive and not merely
illustrative.11 Thus, a legacy of all the testator's houses or of all
the movables in a certain building would be a particular legacy.
But, if the examples in Article 1010 are held to be absolutely
restrictive, the disposition of some other fraction of the estate,
such as one-fourth, would have to be considered a particular
legacy. This dilemma has been circumvented by substituting for
the words une moiti6, un tiers the phrase une quote-part.1 2 This
system has the advantage of being definite and at the same time
conforms to the usual testamentary intention, so the objections
to it need not be taken too seriously.
Can a Will Include Both a Universal Legacy and a Legacy Under
Universal Title?
One of the most disputed problems arising out of codal defi-
nitions of universal legacies and legacies under universal title,
is, how to treat a legacy of the residue of an estate when the
testament also includes a legacy under universal title. To phrase
it otherwise, can a legacy by universal title and a universal leg-
acy coexist?
The argument is that when a testator makes a disposition by
universal title, only a fractional part of the estate remains, and
this could not support a universal legacy. For example, if A
leaves one-third of his estate to B and the residue to C, C gets
only two-thirds of the estate and a legacy of two-thirds of an
estate is a legacy under universal title. But Article 101113 obvi-
ously contemplates a will in which a universal legacy and a leg-
acy by universal title are found together, for it requires the leg-
11. 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, op. cit. supra note 7, at 234, §§ 2386,
2387; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 7, at 955-956, nos 1181, 1182; 21
Demolombe, op. cit. supra note 4, at 504, nos 577, 578; 4 Marcad6, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 88, bU117; 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 649,
no 617.
12. 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, op. cit. supra note 7, at 235, nos 2388,
2389; 3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 7, at 955, no 1181; 4 Marcad6, loc.
cit. supra note 11.
13. Art. 1011, French Civil Code: "Les Zgataires d ttre universel aeront
tenus de demander la ddlivrance aux hdritiers auxqueZa une quotitd des biens
est rdservde par la Zoi, toLur ddfaut, aux Zgataires universela; et d d$faut
de ceux-ci, aux hdritiers appehs dans 'ordre etabli au titre Des Successions."
(Translation) "The legatees under universal title must demand delivery
of the heirs to whom a portion of the property is reserved by law, in the
absence of such heirs, of the universal legatees; and in the absence of the
latter, the demand shall be made of the heirs entitled to take in the order
established in the title Of Successions."
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atee by universal title to demand deliverance of his legacy from
the universal legatee when there are no heirs to the reserve. An
attempt to reconcile this apparent conflict has been made by
holding that if the legacy of the entire estate precedes the legacy
under universal title, it is a universal legacy; if it follows the
legacy under universal title, it is nothing more than a legacy un-
der universal title.14 This result is based upon a conclusive pre-
sumption that if the testator first disposes of the entirety of his
estate and later excepts from that a fractional part, his intention
was to make a universal legacy. Conversely, if he first makes a
legacy of a fraction of his estate, another legacy of the balance
or residue can be intended only as a legacy under universal title.
Nevertheless, a considerable number of the most eminent
commentators have taken a different view." They rely on the
true definition of a universal legacy as being a disposition of the
residue or the eventuality of the estate.16 They point out that it is
not what the legatee actually receives that determines whether
or not it is a universal legacy, but what he may eventually re-
ceive. Thus, even if the testator has disposed of all his property
in other legacies, the gift of the residue still constitutes a uni-
versal legacy. 7 This view appears to be sound, especially in light
of the accepted definition of a universal legacy.
The following compromise has been advocated: If a legacy
of the residue is preceded by a legacy under universal title, the
courts should presume that the intention was to create two leg-
acies by universal title. However, this presumption is subject to
rebuttal. 8
The Particular Legacy
Suppose that a testator dies leaving a total estate of twenty
14. Rteq. 17 octobre 1906, Dalloz 1907.1.497, note Guen~e. 11 Aubry et Rau,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 445, § 714; Coin-Deslisle, op. cit. supra note 4, at 451,
no 8; 7 Delvincourt, Cours de Code Civil (1824 ed. 1834) 9, n. 5; 9 Duranton,
Cours de Droit Frangais (3 ed. 1834) 196, no 186; 3 Toullier, op. cit. supra note
7, at 185, nos 511, 512.
15. 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, op. cit. supra note 7, at 197, no 2299;
3 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 7, at 947, no 1171; 13 Laurent, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 570, no 516; Troplong, op. cit. supra note 3, at 331, no 1784; 3
Zachariae, Le Droit Civil Frangais (transl. 5 ed. 1857) 248, § 487.
16. See note 3, supra.
17. Douai 1 mai 1894, Sirey 1895.2.1; Bordeaux 13 mal 1895, Dalloz 1895.2.
438; Dijon 19 juin 1895, Dalloz 1896.2.165. 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 193, no 2289; 6 Hue, Cornmentaire Th6orique et Pratique
du Code Civil (1894) 415, no 329; 4 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 7, at 70, bs94.
However, in 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 642, it is suggested
that this would be null, even though it is a vulgar substitution, allowed by
Article 898 of the French Civil Code.
18. 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 646, no 614.
1940]
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thousand dollars in cash and in his will leaves A ten thousand
dollars without designating it as one-half of his estate. Would
the legacy of the ten thousand dollars be particular or under a
universal title? The French would seemingly hold this to be a
particular legacy 19 because the apparent intention of the testator
is to give to A ten thousand dollars, no more and no less. This
would be the effect of a particular legacy. However, since it is a
question of intention on the part of the testator, a contrary in-
tention may be shown.
The Legacy of a Usufruct or a Naked Ownership
Probably the most difficult legacies to classify are those deal-
ing with the usufruct and the naked ownership of property. It is
quite generally agreed that a legacy of the naked ownership of
the testator's estate may be a universal legacy, since it gives an
eventual right to the entirety of that estate.20 Likewise, a legacy
of a fractional part of the naked ownership of the estate might be
a legacy under a universal title.21 However, a very different prob-
lem arises when the legacy consists simply of the usufruct. Al-
though Articles 61022 and 61221 indicate that such a legacy could
be universal, under a universal title, or could be a particular leg-
19. Douai 28 janvier 1895, Dalloz 1896.2.110, Sirey 1896.2.206. 21 Demo-
lombe, op. cit. supra note 4, at 469, nos 533, 534.; 13 Laurent, op. cit. supra note
7, at 559, no 508.
20. Toulouse 25 aoft 1871 et sui pourvois, Req. 3 d6cembre 1872, Dalloz
1873.1.233, Sirey 1873.1.73; Riom 23 d6cembre 1889 sous civ. 12 juillet 1892,
Dalloz 1892.1.451, Sirey 1892.1.573; Angers 25 mars 1895, Sirey 1895.2.270. 11
Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 7, at 444, § 714; 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et
Colin, op. cit. supra note 7, at 195, no 2293; 21 Demolombe, op. cit. supra note
4, at 472, no 538 (citing also a list of the commentators on this point); 9
Duranton, op. cit. supra note 14, at 197, no 189; 13 Laurent, op. cit. supra note
7, at 573, no 518; 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 650, no 618.
21. See note 20, supra.
22. Art. 610, French Civil Code: "Le legs fait par un testateur, d'une
rents viag~re on pension alimentaire, dolt otre acquittd par Ie 16gataire uni-
versel de l'usufruit dans son intdgrit6, et par te legataire d titre universel
de l'usufruit dan la proportion de sa jouissance, sans aucune rdpdtetion do
leur part."
(Translation) "A legacy made by a testator of a life annuity or of an
allowance for support must be paid wholly by the universal legatee of the
usufruct and by the legatee under universal title of the usufruct, in propor-
tion to their enjoyment, without any right on their part to claim repayment
thereof."
23. Art. 612, French Civil Code: "L'usufruitior, ou universel, ou 1 titre
universel, doit contribuer avec to propridtaire on paiement des dettes, ainsi
qu'il suit:
On estime la valeur du fonds sujet d usufruit; on fixe ensuite la con-
tribution aux dettes 4 raison de cette valeur. Si h'usufrultler veut avancer
la somme pour laquelle le fonds doit contribuer, te capital lul en est re-
stitud d la fin de 7'usufruit, sans aucun intd4rt.
Si i'usufruitier ne veut pas faire cette avance, he propridtaire a to choix,
on de payer cette somme, et, dans ce cas, l'usufrulter hui tient compte
[Vol. III
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acy, this has been denied by most of the commentators. They
contend that the donation of a usufruct can only constitute a
particular legacy.
24
Others say that Articles 1003 and 1010 when speaking of the
universalitd and the quote-part are speaking quantitatively and
not qualitatively. Thus, to have a universal legacy or a legacy
under universal title, the disposition need merely convey an
interest in the residue or in a quote-part of the estate.25 This the-
ory would certainly give life to Articles 610 and 612 and would
not necessarily cause new complications. If a testament created
a legacy of the entire usufruct and another of the naked owner-
ship, these could be treated as similar to joint universal legacies.
The Court of Cassation has rejected the distinction between
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of Articles 1003 and 1010.
However, it held that a legacy of the usufruct could be under
universal title so as to hold the legatee for his share of succession
debts.26
II. LOUISIANA
The Universal Legacy and the Legacy Under Universal Title
In Louisiana the French version of Article 159927 of the Code
of 1825 was a verbatim reproduction of Article 1003 of the Code
des intdrdts pendant la durde de l'usufruit, ou de faire vendre jusqu',
due concurrence une portion des biens soumis 4 'usufruit.'
(Translation) "The usufructuary, whether universal or under universal
title, must contribute with the owner to payment of the debts in the follow-
ing manner:
The value of the estate, subject to the usufruct, is appraised; the con-
tribution to the debts is then determined, in accordance with that value.
If a usufructuary chooses to advance the amount for which the property
Is liable, the principal is returned to him without any Interest, at the end
of the usufruct.
If the usufructuary is not willing to make that advance, the owner has
the choice between either paying such sum, and in that case the usu-
fructuary owes him interest during the continuance of the usufruct, or
causing a portion of the property subject to the usufruct to be sold, to
the extent of what is due."
24. 11 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 7, at 444, § 714; 21 Demolombe,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 510, no 586; 13 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 7, at 574,
no 518; 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 650, no 618 and n. 1, citing
other authors.
25. Cf. 5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 651, no 618, n. 3.
26. Civ. 7 aofit 1827, Sirey cliv; Req. 8 d6cembre 1862, Dalloz 1863.1.73,
Sirey 1863.1.34; Toulouse 16 mars 1882, Sirey 1883.2.73, note Labb6; Req. 31
janvier 1893, Dalloz 1893.1.359, Sirey 1893.1.438; Civ. 19 juin 1895, Dalloz 1895.
1.470, Sirey 1895.1.336; Rennes 30 juillet 190 et sur pourvoi; Req. 29 juin 1910,
Dalloz 1911.1.49, note Capitant, Sirey 1913.1.33, note Hugueney; Req. 27 no-
vembre 1910, Dalloz 1911.1.176, Sirey 1911.1.168; Orleans 7 juillet 1906, Dalloz
1908.2.345, note Capitant, Sirey 1907.2.121, note Wahl.
27. La. Civil Code of 1825: "Le legs universel est la disposition testamen-
taire, par laquelle Ie testateur donne 4 une ou plusieurs personnes P'univer-
salitd des biens qu'il aissera 4 son ddc~s."
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Napoleon. As pointed out previously, universalit6 was there used
to designate the eventual entirety and not the totalit6 of the suc-
cession. To make matters worse the English translation2 8 used
"the whole of his property" for l'universalitd des biens. Under
such a translation, it is difficult to see how a universal legatee
could coincide with any other testamentary beneficiary. How-
ever, the cases have uniformly overlooked this error.29
Article 161280 of our Code was also copied directly from the
French Code. While the jurisprudence is silent as to whether the
examples used are restrictive, Saunders indicates that they would
be so regarded. 1 Since this is the French view,2 it is very likely
to be accepted by the courts.
Can a Will Include both a Universal Legacy and a Legacy Un-
der Universal Title?
The greatest conflict, as in France, centers around those tes-
taments which provide for a legacy under universal title and a
residuary legacy. Because of the confusion and conflicts in the
cases, a clear picture can be obtained only by a chronological
review.
The case of Aubry v. Cujas,8 decided in 1835, involved an
attempt by a legatee under universal title to force the residuary
legatee to pay all the charges of the succession. The court with-
out discussion held the residuary legacy to be a legacy under
universal title. Ten years later in Prevost v. Martel,84 the court
dismissed a petition by the legitimate heirs of the testator attack-
ing a legacy under universal title, because of the existence of a
28. Art. 1599, La. Civil Code of 1825 (Art. 1606, La. Civil Code of 1870):
"An universal legacy is a testamentary disposition, by which the testator
gives to one or several persons the whole of the property which he leaves at
his decease."
29. Shane & Withers v. Withers' Legatees, 8 La. 489 (1835); Prevost v.
Mantel, 10 Rob. 512 (La. 1845); Shaw v. York, 5 La. Ann. 146 (1850); Succes-
sion of Chedome, 34 La. Ann. 1239 (1882); Succession of Burnsides, 35 La. Ann.
708 (1883); Succession of Blakemore, 43 La. Ann. 845 (1891); Thomas v. Blair,
111 La. 678, 35 So. 811 (1903); Succession of Wilcox, 165 La. 803, 116 So. 192
(1928); Succession of Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931); Succession of
Maus, 177 La. 822, 149 So. 466 (1933); Succession of Peters, 192 La. 744, 189
So. 122 (1939).
30. La Civil Code of 1870: "The legacy under a universal title, is that by
which the testator bequeaths a certain proportion of the effects of which
the law permits him to dispose, as a half, a third, or all of his immovables,
or all his movables, or a fixed proportion of all of hi* Immovables or all his
movables."
31. Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code (1925) 328, 329.
32. See supra note 11.
33. 8 La. 43 (1835).
34. 10 Rob. 512 (La. 1845).
[Vol. III
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residuary universal legatee who alone would profit by the lapse
of such legacy. Later in the same year, the issue was squarely
presented to the court in the case of Compton v. Prescott;5 the
holding was that if a legacy under universal title preceded a leg-
acy of the residue, then the latter was also a legacy under uni-
versal title. In the opinion, the court discussed the question at
length, citing the French commentators. This decision was ap-
proved in Turner v. Smith86 in 1857. Deshotels v. Soileau7 which
came two years later has also been cited as upholding the same
doctrine, but the insufficiency of the facts stated makes a positive
determination of this fact impossible. It does, however, cite
Compton v. Prescott with approval. 38 With the issue seemingly
well settled, the court again cast doubt upon it. In the case of
Succession of Chedome39 in 1882, a residuary legacy following a
disposition of one-fourth of the succession was held to be uni-
versal. This was accomplished by the strange procedure of find-
ing that the legacy of the quarter was a particular legacy. Since
then the issue has not been again raised. As a result of these de-
cisions it seems very likely that although the French view an-
nounced in Compton v. Prescott is to be regarded as the law,
the question is by no means settled.
The Effect of the Testator's Intention.
Although legacies are usually classified according to the na-
ture of the disposition, the Louisiana court is inclined to give
paramount importance to the intention of the testator. Thus a
legacy to two nephews of three thousand dollars, which consti-
tuted the principal object of the estate at the time of the will,
was held to be a conjoint universal legacy, because the testator
had previously called the legatees his "heirs. ' '40 In another case41
a disposition of one-third to A, one-third to B, and one-third to C
was treated as a conjoint universal legacy. So also, was a dis-
position to two legatees of one-half each.42 An even stronger ex-
ample was a legacy of one-fourth which was treated as particu-
lar.43
Suppose a testator makes a disposition equal to the entire
35. 12 Rob. 56 (La. 1845).
36. 12 La. Ann. 47 (1857).
37. 14 La. Ann. 745 (1859).
38. Ibid.
39. 34 La. Ann. 1239 (1882).
40. Shaw v. York, 5 La. Ann. 146 (1850).
41. Shane & Withers v. Withers' Legatees, 8 La. 489 (1835).
42. Succession of Blakemore, 43 La. Ann. 845 (1891).
43. Succession of Chedome, 34 La. Ann. 1239 (1882).
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value of his estate; subsequently, but without any change in the
will, the estate is enormously increased. Should the court under
the presumed intention of the testator declare this to be a uni-
versal legacy?44 The proper method, as pointed out in the Code,45
is to rely on the intention of the testator only when it does not
depart too far from the terms used. From the examples given it
is apparent that the court has stretched the doctrine of "inten-
tion" to its outermost limits.
The Legacy of a Usufruct or a Naked Ownership
On the nature of a legacy of the usufruct of an estate, our
jurisprudence is brief but emphatic. The Succession of Dougart"
upheld the view stated by Saunders, that the legacy of a usufruct
can only be particular.47 In so holding the court said the lan-
guage used in Article 58041 et sequentes, was inadvertant. Appar-
ently there are no cases dealing with the legacy of the naked
ownership of property.
III. CONCLUSION
A general rule may be laid down on a broader and more
troublesome problem of the interpretation of legacies. Articles
1606, 1612, and 1625 define the three types of legacies. The articles
immediately following prescribe the effects of the legacies de-
fined." Therefore the legacy should be classified in order that the
prescribed rights and duties of legatees may be ascertained. The
44. This was the exact situation in Shaw v. York, 5 La. Ann. 146 (1850).
45. Art. 1712, La. Civil Code of 1870.
46. 30 La. Ann. 268 (1878).
47. Saunders, op. cit. supra note 31, at 329.
48. Art. 580, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The legacy of an annuity or alimony
left by a testator is to be wholly acquitted by the universal heir or legatee
of the usufruct, and must be acquitted by the heir or legatee on an universal
title, in proportion to his enjoyment without any claim whatever to reim-
bursement on his part."
49. Art. 1605, La. Civil Code of 1870, and a similar article (1002) of the
French Civil Code provide:
"Each of these dispositions . . . shall have its effect, according to the
rules hereafter established for universal legacies, for legacies under a uni-
versal title, and for particular legacies."
"Et, bien que Ze testateur ait la libertd, en ce qui concerns lea ddnomin-
ations lgales do ces diffdrentes espdces do legs . . . dans sea dispositions,
* * * toute dispositions . . . dolt nianmoins . . . Otre ramende 4 Pune des
espdces de legs ddfinies par Za Zoi, et 6tre apprdcide suivant les rdgles dtablies
pour les legs compris sous chacune de ces rubriques." 3 Zachariae, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 246, § 487.(Translation) "And, although the testator has the liberty, in that which
concerns the legal classification of these different kinds of legacies . . . all
dispositions . . . must nevertheless be brought into one of the kinds of
legacies defined by law and must be judged according to the regulations
established for legacies included under each of these rules."
[Vol. III
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Louisiana courts have on several occasions 0 erroneously classi-
fied a given legacy by asking themselves such questions as, "Did
the testator intend to give the legatee seizin?" or "Did the testa-
tor intend to make the legatee contribute to the charges on the
succession?" and so forth. These are clearly ends of classification
and not means. A court using this method is guilty of circular
reasoning. The proper question should be, "Did the testator in-
tend to dispose of the eventuality, a quote-part, or a particular
object of his estate?"'51 When the terms used by the testator are
ambiguous or inadequate, resort should be had to the section of
the Louisiana Code which prescribes general rules for the inter-
pretation of legacies.52
50. See Shane & Withers v. Withers' Legatees, 8 La. 489, 496 (1835);
Compton v. Prescott, 12 Rob. 56, 66 (1845).
51. "La classification des legs e'op~re sur le fondement do lear objet,
suivant que celui-ci porte sur une universalitd ou sur un objet particulier."
5 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 7, at 641, no 610.
(Translation) "The classification of legacies operates on the basis of
their object, according to whether each one bears on the universality or a
particular object."
"Le question de savior si telle disposition testamentaire constitue un
leg universel, un legs d titre universel, ou un legs 4 titre particulier, doit
6tre ddcidde d'apr6s lee definitions donn~es par la loi, sans 6gard 4 la quali-fication que Ie testateur lui mdme peat avoir attribute d sa disposition, dans
le cas ofz cette qualification no serait point en harmonie avec la nature rdele
de cette derni~re." 11 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 7, at 442, § 714.
(Translation) "The question of knowing if such a testamentary dis-
position constitutes a universal legacy, a legacy by a universal title, or a
legacy by a particular title, must be decided according to the definitions
given by law, without regard to the qualification that the testator himself
might have given to his disposition, in the case where this qualification
would not be in harmony with the real nature of the latter."
52. Arts. 1712-1723, La. Civil Code of 1870, prescribe "General Rules for
the Interpretation of Legacies." Saunders, op. cit. supra note 31, at 346, says
the redactors probably took these articles from Pothier who in turn got
them from the Romans.
Since France has no similar section in their Code, the rule there Is that
the judge must strive to ascertain the intention of the testator without de-
parting too far from the language used. 11 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note
7, at 436, § 712. However, it Is pointed out that the rules established for the
interpretation of conventions in Art. 1156 et seq. of the French Civil Code
would probably apply by analogy. 11 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Colin, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 291, nos 2538, 3540.
In the application of these articles (1712-1723, La. Civil Code of 1870) by
the Louisiana court, great confusion has been apparent. The focal point of
this confusion has been Article 1722 which provides that In case the dis-
position expresses no time, the time of the making of the will is presumed.
Hence, an undated legacy of all books would only include those owned at the
time of the will. In Shane & Withers v. Withers' Legatees, 8 La. 489 (1835),
the court refused to apply this article to a universal legacy, restricting It
to particular legacies. While this in itself seems to be a reasonable inter-
pretation, the court unfortunately used sweeping language to the effect that
these rules "must find their application exclusively to special legacies." (8
La. at 497). This doctrine was affirmed in Shaw v. York, 5 La. Ann. 146
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These are but a few of the problems which have arisen from
the codal provisions on legacies. Due to limitations of space, the
writer has avoided any inquiry into such interesting questions as
what constitutes conjoint legacies, what are the liabilities of the
various types of legatees, et cetera.
WILLIAM M. SHAW
VENUE FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS IN LOUISIANA
The importance of the problem of determining the proper
venue for the trial of criminal offenses has been recently brought
to the foreground by the reversal of two important Louisiana
cases solely on the ground that the trial had not been held in
the proper forum.1 The place where an offender should be tried
is prescribed by the state constitution in practically all jurisdic-
tions. Almost universally the rule is that the trial shall be held
in the county or parish in which the offense was committed.2
The difficulty is one of application. The various elements of a
single crime often take place in different counties. In which of
these counties is it proper to say the offense was committed? This
is likely to be a question of policy.8 The court may be influenced
(1850). However, the Succession of Valentine, 12 La. Ann. 286 (1857), and
Lawson v. Lawson, 12 La. Ann. 693 (1857), though not expressly overruling
these cases did apply Article 1722, La. Civil Code of 1870, to universal legacies.
Finally, the question seemed to be set at rest by Succession of Burnside, 35
La. Ann. 708 (1883), which expressly overruled these last cases insofar as
they might conflict with the holding in the Shane case. Fortunately, the
later cases have ignored the broad language of the Shane case and confined
the decision strictly to the holding. Therefore, we must conclude that the
application of the articles to the interpretation of legacies depends on the
nature of the legacy and the particular article in question. Yet, certain of
them, such as Article 1712, La. Civil Code of 1870, are undoubtedly applicable
to any situation.
1. State v. Coenen, 194 La. 753, 194 So. 771 (1940); State v. Smith, 194 La.
1015, 195 So. 523 (1940). See also State v. Terzia, 194 La. 583, 194 So. 27 (1940)
and State v. Todd, 194 La. 595, 194 So. 31 (1940).
2. It was a settled common law doctrine that jurors in one county were
not competent to pass upon the guilt or innocence of a party in regard to a
crime alleged to have been committed by him in another county. See Buck-
rice v. People, 110 Ill. 29 (1884), and authorities therein cited.
3. Levitt, Jurisdiction Over Crimes (1925) 16 J. Crim. L. and Criminology
316, 495, states the approaches as (1) the "territorial commission" theory, in
which the locus of the crime fixes jurisdiction, (2) the "territorial security"
theory which is coricerned with the protection of a certain area from in-
jurious consequences resulting from crime, and (3) the "cosmopolitan jus-
tice" theory based on the idea that acts detrimental to one territory will
probably prove harmful to the rest.
